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Much of modern scholarship on the public sphere, as well as attempts to refine what is 
conceptually meant by “the public sphere,” take the form of responses to the seminal works of 
Jürgen Habermas. This is not incredibly surprising—Habermas “currently ranks as one of the 
most influential philosophers in the world”1 and certainly maintains this position in discussion of 
the public sphere, the subject which placed him on the map. What is surprising, however, is the 
degree to which the responses to and criticisms of Habermas’s conception of the public sphere 
unreflexively adopt the Kantian rationalism which drives Habermas’s thought, including those 
works which attack his theory as “liberal.” Ultimately, while the great many of these attempts 
succeed in accounting for and even justifying the growing fractures in modern Western “public 
spheres,” their continued attempt to wed the pre- or preter-rational public to the conceptual 
ground rules of an idealized neutral public space produce flawed descriptions of and 
proscriptions for public spheres, something the thought of Carl Schmitt vis-à-vis the 
philosophical and the conceptual sphere can better describe. In other words, we still lack a 
philosophically adequate critique and rival conceptualization of the public sphere. My intention 
in this paper is to engage in such a critique and sketch the beginnings of such an alternative. 
To show this, I will begin by briefly reconstructing Habermas’s account of the public 
sphere as he describes it in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and related 
works. I will then turn to an account of his major critics, showing how they remain committed to 
problematic conceptualizations of rationality in the public sphere. Finally, I will suggest the 
beginnings of a rival theory of the public sphere derived from the social and political theory of 
 
1 James Bohman and William Rehg, “Jürgen Habermas,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta (Fall, 2017), accessed April 26, 2020, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/habermas/>.  
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Carl Schmitt, showing how this conceptualization succeeds in describing modern public spheres 
where both Habermas and the post-Habermasians fail to do so.  
 
1. Habermas and the Public Sphere 
Habermas’s conception of the public sphere may be understood in one sense as 
proceeding from the history of bourgeoise liberal institutions and societal presuppositions, and at 
the same time as a reaction to purely liberal concepts of the private individual and their relation 
to the public. Essentially, Habermas seeks to show how those forces which drove the middle and 
proto-capitalist classes into political power amid the Industrial Revolution and the decline of the 
noble aristocracy were coupled with the emergence of a form of political power that reflected the 
desires and philosophy of this group. Enlightenment philosophy touting the importance of 
rational-critical debate and the consent of the governed in legitimizing any societal efforts or 
stately action formed the basis of this movement. Habermas argues that the physical materia of 
this shift—the newspaper and the encyclopedia—sought to make information accessible to all to 
further this goal. The social materia—the salon and literary gathering—allowed common access 
to and participation in the production and societal digestion of this new media. This not merely 
stemmed from philosophical dedication to the “force of the better argument,”2 mirroring the 
meritocratic and self-reflecting impulses of the ascendant middle class which would give rise to 
capitalism, but also informed the shape of the emerging public sphere, what its ground rules of 
access would be, and how the parties within would act. But Habermas also believes that a deeper 
 
2 R. Stuart Geiger, “Does Habermas Understand the Internet? The Algorithmic Construction of the Blogo/Public 
Sphere,” Gnovis, no. 10 vol. 1 (2009): 2. 
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dive into the history of the public sphere is necessary for conceptually understanding this 
distinctly modern political phenomenon. 
In the historical sense, Habermas begins his study of the public sphere in the Middle 
Ages, where “‘lordly’ and ‘public’ were used synonymously,” “sociologically, that is to say by 
reference to institutional criteria, a public sphere… cannot be shown to have existed,” and to the 
extent that the term “public” in an intelligible sense was employed, only “the attributes of 
lordship, such as the ducal seal, were called ‘public.’”3 He then traces several centuries of 
historical shift that began with the Reformation where the formerly lordly and therefore “public” 
Church became subsumed by the individual—or at the very least the state in the abstract—via 
freedom of religion as the “first area of private autonomy.”4 At the pre-nascent stage of 
Habermas’s history of the public sphere, the Church represented a community where literal 
communion was enforced via top-down magisterial rules directly contrary to enlightenment 
conceptions of reason. The Bishops of the Church were present before God and before their 
flock—literally, they were the physical embodiment of a mystical body representing those 
assembled. Representing, here, takes on not our modern conception of representation as a 
service, but rather as showing power before, claiming to be a sort of ontological prior.5 In this 
sense, the Church was a public body. Secular authority was much the same. In the Middle Ages, 
one would think of the royalty and the nobility as the literal embodiment of the state. Habermas 
says of the time, “the prince and the estates of the realm still ‘are’ the land, instead of merely 
functioning as deputies for it,”  and that the nobility would “re-present” their power, that is, 
 
3 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick 
Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991): 6-7. 
4 Jürgen Habermas, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article,” trans. Sara Lennox and Frank Lennox, New 
German Critique, no. 3 (1974): 51. 
5 Habermas, 1991, 8-9. 
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“present it before the people.”6 Nobles, Kings, and the Church were involved directly with the 
common folk, acting as judges in disputes and presiding over celebrations in streets and 
commons. The public, then, was something which was omnipresent but above the people, in a 
way unlike any political institution we know today.  
However, two processes of what Habermas calls polarization began to take place, 
completely changing this. The first is that power began to shift away from a decentralized, 
locally present nobility and Church, and towards a single monarch in the style of absolutism. The 
nobility “no longer had to represent its own lordliness,” but rather now “served as a vehicle for 
the representation of the monarch.”7 This is important because we see a deputization of a stately 
institution, where a class no longer is an embodiment of power itself but rather is a sort of tool to 
execute the power of another. At the same time, it also means that a great deal of power was 
accumulating in the throne of the King, such that this single institution would decide the religion 
of the country (a blow to the public Church), the laws of the state, and its foreign affairs. The 
second process of polarization is that the King as a man and his stately authority began to 
separate. This separation “was visibly manifested in the separation of the public budget from the 
private household expenses of a ruler.”8 This left Europe with a system where depersonalized 
authority enforced stately decisions made by an office, and the persons which inhabited the two 
were secondary in import, thus allowing the common folk to observe, comment on, and 
potentially interact with stately decision making in a way which they could not when it was 
inexorably bound to the personage of the nobility.  
 
6 Habermas, 1974, 51. 
7 Habermas, 1991, 10. 
8 Habermas, 1974, 51 
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At the same time, historical mercantile development and the advent of markets and joint 
stock companies allowed the emergent bourgeoise class to slowly rise to a dominant position in 
the social structure. In their ascendency, the bourgeoise brought with them certain institutions—
namely newspapers, salons, and other instruments of rational-critical discourse.9 These 
institutions would grow in repute and power with their associated class, and would soon form the 
basis for a public sphere which in the modern sense represented the public. As a “corollary of 
[the] depersonalized state authority” discussed above, a slow “privatization of the process of 
economic reproduction”10 occurred. Slowly, privately-owned industry overtook agrarian 
feudalism in economic importance. This, combined with private industry becoming “orientated 
toward a commodity market that had expanded under public direction and supervision,” meant 
that the economy was no longer a product to be owned by a few embodied members of the 
nobility, but rather existed in a depersonalized way which common folk could interact with. This 
forced individuals to conceive of a realm of shared material interest. This realm could be 
reported on by newspapers—first used by Hanseatic traders in the Baltic Sea, perhaps the 
idealized form of the early bourgeoise, to report prices and profits—and commentated on 
through gatherings, not merely of amassed individuals, but individuals who could form 
“something approaching public opinion.”11 This, according to Habermas, defines the public 
sphere.12  
In some ways, Habermas’s retelling of the public sphere’s creation mimics certain basic 
liberal intuitions. Here we find a story of how out of and opposed to the darkness of the Middle 
 
9 Habermas, 1991, 21. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Habermas, 1974, 49. 
12 Ibid. 
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Ages comes a sort of free speech, hand-in-hand with and in fact pushed by market freedoms and 
economic development. Indeed, it is a story of how regressive, anti-rational institutions such as 
the Church and monarchy are replaced through common concern in a world-historical 
achievement of the bourgeoisie. However, Habermas primarily makes a name for himself in his 
conceptual opposition to certain liberal presuppositions regarding the state and nature of the 
public sphere. For one, Habermas points out that “a portion of the public sphere comes into being 
in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body.”13 Consider, 
by contrast, the view of a paradigmatic liberal theorist like John Locke regarding public consent. 
Locke bases his philosophical system upon the concept that man is “by nature, all free, equal, 
and independent,” such that all humans naturally and pre-societally possess the ability to make 
autonomous decisions and enjoin themselves in contracts, and that “no one can be put out of this 
estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent.”14 However, 
Locke says, “when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a 
community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, 
which is only by the will and determination of the majority.”15 In essence, Locke claims that 
men, being free and equal, are always and by essence able to engage in the sort of discourse 
which allows for individuals to constitute a public and make sweeping decisions on their nature 
and opinion, up to and including their unity and disunity. In other words, the public square is 
natural and ready-made. It is not a historical accomplishment via a shift in society’s collective 
political, economic, and social forms.  
 
13 Ibid. 
14 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. Dave Gowan, Project Gutenberg, last modified September 5, 
2017, accessed April 26, 2020, ULR = < https://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm>. 
15 Ibid. 
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But rather than a purely Lockean worldview where some pre-societal space exists 
always-already for debate and discussion, Habermas conceives of a public sphere which “comes 
to be” upon the inception and use of consciously-created social arenas, defined by already 
enjoined individuals discussing “matters of general interest.”16 And this public is enjoined 
politically by the state, which “the political public sphere” is “connected to the activity of” as the 
object of common or general interest. 17  Essentially, Locke’s error is that he maintains a 
common “identification of the public of ‘property owners’ with that of ‘common human beings’” 
such that common material interest is assumed for all interlocutors on the basis that they can, in 
theory, hold property.18 Because Locke sees the capacity to hold property as that ability which 
makes man by nature free, he imagines the capacity for two individuals to share a material 
interest always exists.19 However, this mistakes potentiality for actuality; indeed, history tells us 
that land-owners and those who hold no such property very often have conflicting, and not 
common, material interest. Indeed, that is to say nothing of the conflict which exists between 
property-owners in the absence of some unifying stately order, which is often even more 
contentious than the divide between the haves and have-nots. Legitimate common material 
interest which can be rationally discussed therefore only fully exists where one can expect rules 
and a common entity to inform the holding and acquisition of property. Rational-critical debate 
in the political public sphere, then, is a consequent of the state and its intrinsic role as an object 
of immediate material interest for all those it, in theory, “care[s] for the well-being of.”20 
Pursuant to this, Habermas delineates an “ideal vision of a social world in which the only force 
 
16 Habermas, 1974, 49. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Habermas, 1991, 56 
19 Ibid. 
20 Habermas, 1974, 49. 
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[is] discourse, or ‘the unforced force of the better argument.’”21 It is only through the existence 
of the state, then, that this can be achieved. 
Habermas defines unforced to include the sort of non-coercive reason which only secular 
arguments which can be accepted without any prior philosophical support can provide. Religious 
arguments and even arguments referential to nationalistic and highly ideological value-
judgements must be subject to what Habermas dubs the “institutional translation proviso,” such 
that “in the course of the debate, these religious reasons are adequately translated into secular 
reasons equally accessible to all.”22 This latter point shows a crucial debt to the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant and his transcendental notion of reason. This crucial point to my overall 
analysis—which seeks to criticize liberal, transcendental conceptions of political reason—
requires a short explanation of Kant’s argument. 
As is well known, Kant holds that no group or society should “have the right to commit 
itself by oath to a certain unalterable doctrine”23 as such a thing would violate the tenets of free 
reason. Kant, who argues that “the metaphysics of morals is to investigate the idea and principles 
of [a priori reason], and not the actions and conditions of human volition in general,”24 maintains 
that effective and ethical governance and moral guidance must align with rules defined “fully a 
priori merely through reason” and not “from the empirical ones that understanding raises to 
universal concepts through the comparison of experiences.”25 What Kant is arguing is that 
 
21 Gieger, 2. 
22 Patrick Loobuyck and Stefan Rummens, “Religious Arguments in the Public Sphere: Comparing Habermas with 
Rawls,” in Ars Disputandi, vol. 5 (2011): 238. 
23 Immanuel Kant, What Is Enlightenment? trans. Mary C. Smith, Colombia.edu, Columbia University, accessed 
April 26, 2020, URL = <http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html>. 
24 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1981): 4. 
25 Ibid. 
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nothing which could be different culturally, anthropologically, or perhaps even physically may 
form the basis of a moral law. Any real moral law, binding all men at all times, must be a 
“universal maxim.”26 Cultural or religious duties, which one could have rejected had 
circumstances been different, do not themselves satisfy this; nor do biologically- or 
psychologically-informed standards, as these sorts of claims merely describe states of being and 
do not describe how we ought to act. Rather, only that which must be true in all possible 
circumstances (for Kant, the first among these is noncontradiction) may give the basis for moral 
laws. And as reason is the gateway to understanding these laws, none may be deprived of their 
reason through lying, the use of jargon, or the employment of religious or ideological argument 
with which one could conceivably disagree, as this forces the individual out of reason and thus 
out of their ability to discern the moral law.  
Just as Kant sees the unrestricted use of reason as vital to a legitimate moral order, 
Habermas sees the same as vital for a legitimate public order. Indeed, Habermas writes that 
while the formulas of rationality in political discourse “received its classic formulation in the 
Kantian doctrine of right,” an understanding of its role in the realm of public opinion “was 
revealed as problematic by Hegel and Marx.”27 In other words, the existence of a functioning 
modern public sphere rests on certain material facts which enable participatory rational-critical 
debate to occur. Unlike Kant’s purely transcendental view of legitimacy existing where reason is 
permitted by law, therefore creating a more negative, quasi-liberal view of legitimacy, Habermas 
sees legitimacy as ensured by material conditions. In Habermas’s view, this sort of legitimacy 
only exists where commonly accessible rational-critical debate surrounding some singular 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 Habermas, 1991, 89. 
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common interest can exist, committing him to an assessment that such a sphere does not truly 
exist today. On the one hand, the “barriers to entry associated with radio, television, and print 
media”28 separate modern media from true common access, while the “millions of fragmented 
chat rooms” that make up the Internet prevent a true singular public from forming, instead giving 
rise to “a huge number of isolated issue publics.”29 Even if these barriers did not exist, one may 
wonder if, in the society commentators fall over themselves to point out is more polarized today 
than ever before, a neutral, agnostic individual of pure reason could engage in truly objective, 
critical debate. But one must remember that the bourgeoisie class which created the public 
sphere was that same class, and indeed many of the same individuals, who created the liberal 
state. Their tools of legitimization, the newspaper, the encyclopedia, the solon and the gathering-
hall, served both the state and the public sphere. Habermas writes that, from the seventeenth to 
nineteenth centuries, “a political consciousness developed in the public sphere of civil society 
which, in opposition to absolute sovereignty, articulated the concept of and demand for general 
and abstract laws” which only “itself (i.e., public opinion)” could legitimate.30 But this process of 
legitimation would only persist as long as public opinion continued to exist and guide the law as 
a legitimating force. “The clichés of ‘equality’ and liberty,’” Habermas writes, only remain 
“imbued with life” so long as there exists “secured space” for the individual to engage with 
public reason “by literary means,” and not merely exist as a passive or compartmentalized 
viewer of some depersonalized conversation.31 For if this discussion does not exist in a way the 
individual could interact with, it becomes again like an authority that does not represent, but 
 
28 Loobuyck and Rummens, 246. 
29 Jürgen Habermas, “Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic 
Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research,” Communication Theory, vol. 16 issue 4 
(2006): 419. 
30 Habermas, 1991, 54. 
31 Ibid. 
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rather re-presents, shows its status and power before the individual, and informs them of public 
truth, but does not invite. This leads me to conclude that, for Habermas, those same factors 
which historically legitimated the liberal state legitimate and indeed are the necessary causes of a 
functioning public sphere (common accessibility, a dedication to rationality, and a central subject 
of common interest). 
 
2. Critique of Habermas’s Theory  
So here we have an account of how the modern public sphere formed, the debt it owed to 
a philosophical commitment to rational-critical debate, and how it has decayed due to a lack of 
the same. However, a basic philosophical tension emerges from this account—is Habermas 
providing a prescriptive claim for that which a functioning public sphere must have to arise, or is 
he providing a descriptive claim for what is ideologically justifying in a bourgeois liberal view of 
legitimacy, and unreflectively adopting the same in his criteria? Numerous later critics, two of 
whom we will investigate in depth below, challenge Habermas’s views on the centrality of some 
single public sphere, making the claim that periphery or counter-publics, with their own internal 
conventions regarding commonly accessible language and what falls within the realm of “public 
issue” exist separate from, interact with, and oftentimes engage in conflict with some central 
societal public sphere.  
But very little exists in the way of criticizing Habermas’s concept of what defines 
rational-critical debate. Habermas’s insistence on religious and ideological arguments being 
translated into “secular reasons” is itself indicative of a system of evaluation rooted in a specific 
Western post-Reformation Enlightenment cultural and ideological context and overlooks certain 
12 
 
liberal processes and appeals which themselves are highly ideological and biased. What if 
Habermas naturalizes certain liberal suppositions of neutrality which themselves are not natural, 
thus leading to a flawed description of what rational-critical debate looks like, thereby distorting 
his view of the public sphere? It is possible that Habermas only provides a fully accurate 
description of the public sphere formed by the liberal bourgeoise of the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-centuries, in which the participants agreed upon and instituted certain rules reflecting 
their own ideological tradition which held a contestable definition of rational-critical debate. If 
true, this may have led to a flawed conceptual definition of the sphere itself and a flawed 
understanding in his later critics of how multiple spheres interact—that the standards of debate 
within spheres reflect “mere opinions (cultural assumptions, normative attitudes, collective 
prejudices and values)”32 and do not stand above history. In my view Habermas’s critics—
although brining important issues to light—do not disentangle themselves from this problem. I 
intend to here provide an overview of several influential of Habermas’s most prominent critics, 
delineating their positions, with an emphasis on how their critiques assume Habermas’s 
definition of rational-critical debate, and then showing why this leads to internal problems and 
overall weakness in their theories of the public sphere. Habermas’s critics are still, unbeknownst 
to themselves, in the thrall of Habermas. 
Consider the prominent feminist scholar Nancy Fraser who offers a highly influential 
critique of Habermas. Fraser’s concern is the way that Habermas’s single all-encompassing 
sphere for the totality of society neglects a system where “a plurality of competing publics”33 
 
32 Habermas, 1974, 50. 
33 Nancy Fraser, “Politics, Culture, and the Public Sphere: Towards a Postmodern Conception,” in Social 
Postmodernism: Beyond Identity Politics, ed. Linda Nicholson, and Steven Seidman (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995): 292. 
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allow individual segments of a society and those others concerned for their particular wellbeing 
(women, minorities, and the LGBT) to discuss and deliberate over issues which otherwise might 
be overlooked by society-at-large due to being seen as merely a private issue. Fraser states that 
different groups within a single society (that is, identity groups enjoined under one state) may 
have material interests which cannot be discussed within the context of the dominant public 
sphere. Fraser imagines that racial identities which de facto influence policy and outcomes may 
be regarded as a non-political issue, thereby not having a space to be debated in the public 
sphere, or that one’s sexual proclivities may be considered a private matter, when to the 
individual in question (if they are homo- or transsexual, for example) they constitute an 
important matter of truly public concern. Indeed, Fraser posits that this may be a semiconscious 
effort to minimize such uncomfortable differences as well as the interests of these groups. As 
such, Fraser identifies not one “public sphere” enjoined to a matter of common material political 
concern (the state) as does Habermas, but rather theorizes the existence of many separate 
“counterpublics,”34 largely constituting dissidents and minority identity groups, who draw 
different lines of distinction on matters of public interest and private concern. While Habermas 
himself does not draw a delineation on what constitutes public concern and what constitutes 
private concern, his dedication to the concept of common material concern as necessary to 
generate a public sphere as well as his unitary vision of a single public sphere existing in tandem 
with the state means his vision is not compatible with a system of counter publics. Fraser also 
identifies that the relationship between these counter publics and other, more established publics 
 
34 Ibid, 291. 
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(those dominated by the interests of males, Whites, and heterosexuals) is “more likely to be 
contestatory than deliberative.”35  
However, Fraser makes two mistakes in her analysis of the situation. Despite her attempt 
to rebut Habermas in a “postmodern, postliberal manner,” Fraser unreflectively imports 
Habermas’s dedication to liberal standards of rational-critical debate into her analysis. For one, 
Fraser identifies a discrepancy in social status as the origin for the contestory relationship 
between public spheres, saying it is merely “relations among differently empowered publics in 
stratified societies”36 which are likely to manifest in this way. Fraser supposes that progress 
towards a “more egalitarian and democratic” system, where the totality of identity issues which 
individual members of society find publicly relevant are considered in the public sphere, is 
possible if material disparity is eliminated.37 Fraser also naturalizes the unforced force of the 
better argument, believing that absent social dominance hierarchies, better formulations of the 
public-private distinction will make themselves manifest. But the full error here is only seen in 
light of an additional error—Fraser assumes that the “expan[sion] of public space” wrought by 
contestory publics force “assumptions that were previously exempt from contestation” to be 
“publicly argued out,” creating a “widening of discursive contestation” and therefore a 
“movement towards greater democracy.”38 This assumes that counter publics exist as one 
competing product among many in the liberal marketplace of ideas, forcing dominant public 
spheres to examine their distinctions and, with a large enough n of external pressures, force 
through a veritable marketplace of ideas the triumphant and ideal distinction, won out as the best 
 
35 Ibid, 292. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid, 291.  
38 Ibid. 
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argument. However, this is simply not the case. Even if reason and discourse of this sort can 
determine which identity features are publicly relevant in some time and place, the function of 
the public sphere must be to determine which identity features should be politically relevant. 
These questions must be referential to some already extant public debate, which itself must be 
referential to some larger central question. For example, commentators would not find it at all 
relevant to discuss rules on what hair styles are permitted in our nation’s public schools if these 
questions of identity (hair style) were not already relevant to the larger question of race, which in 
turn finds its context in the credal, traditional, and economic questions of our state. The full 
import of this point will be seen further on.39 
In another influential critique of Habermas, social theorist Craig Calhoun echoes Fraser’s 
position, criticizing Habermas on the grounds of his public sphere not being able to account for 
the “attempts to affirm or reshape identities” of modern politics, which seem to be legitimately 
established in public, and not merely private, realms.40 At the same time, Calhoun labels 
nationalism as an enemy of the public sphere, saying that it denies “the plurality that was crucial 
to the idea of democratic self-government through the public sphere” and is thereby “the enemy 
of rational-critical discourse.”41 In essence, this is to say that an expansion of what can be 
discussed in the public sphere (at least in relation to the question of what identity is public and 
what is private) amounts to a proper exercise of rational-critical debate, while a restriction or 
refinement of it is an abuse of it, even when the people as a whole desire the change. Ostensibly, 
this is because the public sphere is defined by diversity, and nationalism offers “repression of 
 
39 See page 27 
40 Craig Calhoun, “The Public Good as a Social Project,” in Private Action and the Public Good, ed. Walter W. Powell 
and Elisabeth S. Clemens (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998): 22. 
41 Craig Calhoun, “Civil Society and the Public Sphere,” in Public Culture, vol. 5 issue 2 (Winter 1993): 274.  
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internal difference.”42 But rationality is not defined by liberality; to suggest such a thing is to 
naturalize liberal ideas to such an extent that the liberal commitment to inclusivity is prior to 
truth in terms of reason-making. Indeed, simply because the spaces and materia of the public 
sphere must be in theory accessible to all does not mean that all possible users must agree to the 
philosophical foundations of every use of every space. While Habermas and his critics do 
assume some common philosophical ground must exist, this not merely assumes that empathy in 
argumentation and the possibility of imminent critique lie outside the bounds of rationality, it 
also begs the question of why common material concern manifested in a non-religious, non-
nationalistic, and in any other illiberal way fall beyond the purview of reason. Perhaps if we 
assume liberalism is a self-justifying and rational system and all other thought-worlds are not 
(something I doubt critics like Fraser, and even Habermas himself, would ascent to) this claim 
holds, but even then we must contend with the questions that non-violent and amaterial debates 
from before the rise of liberalism (those between the Thomists and Scotists for example) pose for 
such a position.  
But more than this, these rules do not demand substantive political conclusions in support 
of liberal pluralism. To suppose they do supposes that Mill’s argument for liberal tolerance is a 
direct result of accepting the rules of logic, and not a heuristic employed to produce the greatest 
number of true outcomes. Just as it is not at all irrational for a teacher to censor false answers, it 
is not at all irrational for a nation to do the same, provided the form of arguments provided for 
doing so is valid. It may be immoral, depending on what arguments are censored (religious, 
cultural, so on); it may even be unwise, as conflict may strengthen arguments for the truth. But in 
no way is it irrational, when understood in light of the formal rules of rationality, to shrink rather 
 
42 Ibid. 
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than expand the scope of public concern. As such, it should not be the case that any attempt to 
establish a counter public or rhetorically accost the dominant public sphere with a restricted 
conception of the public-private distinction somehow harms the rational validity of the public 
sphere. Even if an ideal can be reached through some marketplace-type deliberation, it is equally 
important to have voices advocating for a restriction of the distinction as it is to have voices 
arguing for an expansion; only then could the latter and indeed the status quo be fully tested and 
proven out. But it seems as though any restriction in any level or sphere runs contrary to liberal 
suppositions of total accessibility and the Kantian demand of sapere aude, the Kantian motto that 
in the face of all else one ought dare to know—here, Enlightenment thought sets up contrary 
goals. 
Indeed, is it not the case that those who inhabit insurgent public spheres do not merely 
seek to educate and debate the dominant coalition, but rather also seek political power to 
restructure legal and material reality such that others will be brought into and under their 
understanding of the public-private distinction? And is it not also the case that any discussion 
between an insurgent and a dominant public sphere member will consist not of one attempting to 
slowly reconstitute the other’s sphere by changing individual features of understanding, but 
rather that proof or disproof of a particular outlooks conquers the sphere as a whole and 
delegitimizes the project, such that the prior sphere is consumed or subsumed by the rival? As 
such, to consider debate between public spheres a rational dispute between members of a society 
both working towards a singular transcendental truth is to misunderstand the stakes—rather, it is 
a polemical conflict of rhetoric between political cultures, all vying for material power through 
the clash of rationally incontestable standards of distinction.  
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3. Schmitt as Critic and an Alternative View 
The latter line of critical thought is inspired partly by the political philosophy of Carl 
Schmitt, whose vision of sovereignty and the state has met with a resurgence of interest with 
political theorists across the ideological spectrum in recent decades. On the right, one prominent 
theorist whose work has been heavily influenced by Schmitt would be Adrian Vermeule, who 
describes Schmitt as the only theorist of constitutional orders capable of conceptualizing the 
modern administrative state. In his book The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian 
Republic, Vermeule describes the modern state as one where “the executive governs, subject to 
legal constraints that are shaky in normal times and weak or nonexistent in times of crisis,” such 
that only Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty deriving from the authority to determine an exception 
to the legal norm holds true for the modern liberal state.43 A similar voice on the left would be 
Enzo Traverso, who writes in his historical survey Fire and Blood: The European Civil War, 
1914-1945 that Schmitt’s theories “sketch the anatomy of civil war as a cruel conflict without 
shared rules that is a fairly exact description of the confrontations that ravaged Europe between 
1914 and 1945.”44 For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on Schmitt’s concept of historical 
neutralization, elaborated on in The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations, and his concept 
of life-spheres, elaborated on in The Concept of the Political, will allow me to fully critique the 
Habermasian and post-Habermasian view of the public sphere, and then to sketch an alternative 
understanding of the term.  
 
43 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2013): 4. 
44 Enzo Traverso, Fire and Blood: The European Civil War, 1914-1945, trans. David Fernbach (London, UK: Verso, 
2017): 77. 
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I will begin with Schmitt’s concept of historical neutralization. In tracing the 
development of the bourgeois public sphere, Habermas identified two historical processes which 
the bourgeoisie would later exploit in their social ascendancy—the first a shift from 
decentralized local power to a unified national power, and the second a shift from embodied 
personal power to a sort of power of the office or title in the abstract. These changes, Habermas 
argues, allowed the bourgeoisie to comment on and interact with political power to such an 
extent that eventually the bourgeoisie themselves and their newspapers and salons would become 
the directing and legitimating force for political action. Similarly, Schmitt writes on the 
development of modern discourse, but rather than giving an account of the materia and spaces 
which developed to discuss ideas, Schmitt focuses on the slow philosophical shift in the age’s 
predominant ideas themselves. A knowledge of Schmitt allows us to introduce to Habermas’s 
two concepts of polarization a third historical process—that of neutralization. Like Habermas, 
Schmitt begins at the Reformation, but for very different reasons. Arguing that the Wars of 
Religion scarred and demystified European expectations of the confessor-state, and that Europe 
began to search for a realm of discussion where cooperation, not conflict, would rule the day. In 
other words, the prominent minds of the day slowly adjusted their focus in terms of what held 
political and philosophical import over the proceeding four centuries, searching for a subject of 
discussion which could solve, or at the very least bracket, all other debate. Whatever subject was 
said to be of this greatest import Schmitt labels ‘the center.’ These centers have been the 
theological, which this reader finds exemplified in the thought of Aquinas and Luther; the 
metaphysical, which Schmitt finds exemplified in Spinoza; the ethical, which Schmitt finds 
exemplified in Kant; and the economic, which Schmitt finds exemplified in Marx. As Schmitt 
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puts it: “the thinking of the active elite which constituted the respective vanguard moved in the 
changing centuries around changing centers.”45 
For Schmitt, these centers demarcate the starting-out point of philosophical thought 
which, for those captivated by them, “constituted their concept of truth” such that “if a domain of 
thought becomes central, then problems of the other domains are solved in terms of the central 
domain.”46 Consider how Kant operates as though ethics and logic themselves are synonyms. To 
the ethics-minded Kantian, even “God appears as a ‘parasite of ethics,’” and all problems of law, 
morality, and property were referential to universal maxims accessible through the proper 
practice of ethics.47 This can be contrasted with the economic mind, which holds that “one needs 
only solve adequately the problem of the production and distribution of goods in order to make 
superfluous all moral and social questions.”48 One can see easily how Marx, who believed the 
end of property and class struggle would bring with it total solidarity, typifies the concept of an 
economic center. However, this concept of the center is not merely philosophical and potent in 
the minds of a select few thinkers, but rather it is also sociological. Individuals, communities, 
municipalities and nations exist with different centers from one another even within the same 
age, which is something any observer can recognize; even today there remain Thomists. Schmitt 
writes that it “would be a misunderstanding to interpret the successive stages in such a way that 
in each of these centuries there was nothing more than the central domain. On the contrary, there 
is always a plurality of diverse, already spent stages coexisting.”49 For Schmitt, the questions of 
changing centers “concern only the concrete fact that in these four centuries of European history 
 
45 Carl Schmitt, The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations, trans. George Schwab (Chicago, IL: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 2008): 82. 
46 Ibid., 86-90. 
47 Ibid., 83-84 
48 Ibid., 86. 
49 Ibid., 82-83. 
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the intellectual vanguard changed, that is its convictions and arguments continued to change, as 
did the content of its intellectual interests, the basis of its actions, the secret of its political 
success, and the willingness of the great masses to be impressed by certain suggestions.”50  
To illustrate this, Schmitt identifies how “the theologian and preacher of the sixteenth 
century was followed by the scholarly systematizer of the seventeenth century” in claiming their 
ability to produce a system of thought which would satisfy the European philosophical-political 
desire for a “neutral domain” in which any body of people “could reach common agreement 
through the debates and exchanges of opinion” that only some legitimizing arena can provide.51 
It should be noted that this is exactly what Habermas has in mind when he describes the public 
sphere as an arena where public opinion may be formed. But just “as clear and distinct as any 
unique historical occurrence,” Schmitt describes a process by which each center gives way to 
another; whether it be evolutionary, devolutionary, or neither, changing historical circumstances 
and an inability for each center to establish itself as a non-contentious grounding for political and 
philosophical legitimacy demand that passing generations of thinkers bring the center, which 
seeks neutrality and to bracket all else, to a new realm of discussion. Just as certainly as how “in 
the final analysis, Rousseau’s social contract is only a vulgarization of Pufendorf” and how 
“every word” in Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason- critique, pure, and reason- is polemically 
directed against dogma, metaphysics, and ontology,” so too has the European mind flowed 
downhill in search for its resting place of neutral height.52 For every shot aimed at a preceding 
center is a shot aimed to destroy the prior’s claim to neutrality: for the metaphysicist Hobbes 
who admitted a first cause, the God of Aquinas rested on unprovable culturally-derived 
 
50 Ibid., 83. 
51 Ibid., 85-89. 
52 Ibid., 83-84. 
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superstition; for the ethicist Kant, the epistemology and psychology behind Leviathan were as 
flimsy as any non-neutral, contingent a posteriori fact; for the economically-minded Marx, who 
sought ultimate neutrality in describing his work as merely descriptive and himself as a scientist, 
the philosophy of Kant assumes the bourgeoise liberal values of his time in its proscriptive 
elements. And as reading publics slowly grow unsatisfied with a system’s ability to provide 
value-neutral claims to truth, so too do they grow unsatisfied with the legitimacy of those 
institutions supported by these systems, most notably the state. Thusly, the need for polemics for 
and against the legitimacy of the state in this new language of neutrality are needed, and the state 
must either present itself to this public in a new light or perish, bringing about a change in the 
language and perception of the state- that is, the concept of the state itself.  
From here, the true error of Habermas becomes visible. For while Habermas aims to 
describe the material conditions necessary for a public sphere to arise, he weds these conditions 
to philosophical proscriptions regarding their proper form and nature. Habermas is correct in 
arguing that a commonly accessible forum surrounding a domain of common concern is 
necessary for the formation of a public sphere. But the definitions which Habermas provides for 
these phrases are not as philosophically neutral as Habermas would believe. For instance, 
consider how Habermas sees his institutional translation proviso as necessary for a functioning 
public sphere. Habermas identifies a sort of philosophical accessibility alongside physical and 
literary accessibility as being necessary for the maintenance of a public sphere. In doing so, he 
claims that certain arguments, such as the nationalistic or the religious, be “adequately translated 
into secular reasons equally accessible to all” material interest before they can meaningfully 
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count as part of public debate.53 That is, Habermas identifies a topic which brackets all others—
the economic—and requires that the concept of rational debate center itself around said topic.  
The error here is that Habermas has naturalized an economic center in his philosophical 
understanding of the public sphere. The issue is not with rationality per se, but rather Habermas’s 
equivocation of rational argumentation with the translation of all ‘public’ arguments into 
questions of shared material interests, such that questions of alternative centers must be relegated 
to a decisionistic private realm. Because the bourgeoisie he studies were swept into social power 
through a historical process of economic change based around property rights, they as a class 
tend philosophically towards an economic philosophical center, and their justifying arguments 
for legitimacy rest on the economic. And while the bourgeoisie historically were the creators of 
the public sphere, Habermas mistakes this fact for the supposition that institutions aligning with 
the economic concept of truth must be the creators of such a sphere. It is true that the institutions 
of the bourgeoise were associated with the economic center, but it is mere historical coincidence 
that ‘progression’ towards such an economic center was associated with a greater legal capacity 
to debate and engage in critical discussion. The economic center is inherently no less 
exclusionary to dissenters than any other. Just as the state, which Schmitt writes “derives its 
reality and power from the respective social domain” or center, may only tolerate one state 
religion under a theological center, the modern economic state may only tolerate one economic 
system.54 In the socialist states of the last century, adherence to a capitalist perspective was 
punished via the gulag and the struggle session; in the capitalist states, the reverse was met with 
McCarthyism and blackballing. The active difference is not the philosophical center, but rather 
 
53 Loobuyck and Rummens, 238. 
54 Schmitt, 2008a, 87. 
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the existence of the materia. A polarizing political, depersonalized political order forming in 
tandem with a rising class reliant on publishing and open discussion of a common matter of 
concern is all that is needed. At least in the realm of concept, is it not possible to imagine a 
history where the social order of Europe circa 1500 AD allowed not a mercantile class reliant on 
stock-trading papers to rise, but rather a priestly class reliant on publishing as Luther was? And 
might we not imagine, then, that the analogous salons and journals of this class could give rise to 
a public sphere? If imagining such a thing is possible in concept, then we can be certain that 
Habermas is wrong when he identifies his formulation of institutional translation proviso and 
common material (read: economically-derivative) interest as necessary for a functioning public 
sphere.  
So what, then, does the public sphere look like? It retains its material conditions for 
existence. It may be stripped of its specific philosophical condition—that is, what Habermas 
identifies as the only rational subject of common concern—but even if Habermas was mistaken 
in identifying what the philosophical condition was, he is correct in maintaining that there must 
be such a category. For even if it is not an economically minded space of philosophical 
neutrality, there must exist some realm or object of common interest which legitimately unites 
participants in a sphere of discourse. What that common interest is depends upon the intellectual 
and historical conditions surrounding the institutions of the sphere. Habermas identifies the 
political public sphere with discussion surrounding “objects connected to the activity of the 
state.”55  But the state itself is molded by the philosophical center—not only does the state as an 
institution “derive… its reality and power from the respective social domain,” but the self-
 
55 Habermas, 1974, 49. 
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identification of the public will be defined in this light as well, considering the fact that “the 
decisive disputes of friend-enemy groupings are also determined by it.” 
This leads into the second Schmittian concept of import, that of the life-sphere. For 
Schmitt, “the various relatively independent endeavors of human thought and action” each “has 
its own criteria which express themselves in a characteristic way” by defining an interior and an 
exterior.56 This distinction separates the desirable and accepted from the undesirable and refused. 
For example, the moral endeavor is defined by a distinction between the right and the wrong; the 
aesthetic between the beautiful and the ugly; the political between the friend and the enemy. That 
which falls within the sphere is tolerated, while that which falls outside of the sphere is rejected 
and threatens the sanctity of that which is within the sphere. For example, to those who held to a 
classical aesthetic sphere at the turn of the century, the work of cubists, surrealists, and others 
threatened the legitimacy of classic artistic expression and was at the same time unintelligible to 
their conception of beauty. Decidedly, it fell outside of the sphere, and was therefore perceived 
as ugly. But primary among these is the distinction between friend an enemy. More than a mere 
expression of distaste, Schmitt writes that “the distinction of friend and enemy denotes the 
utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation.”57 To Schmitt, this is the distinction which 
decides the political—which individuals lay within the sphere such that one would give their life 
to protect them, and those who lay without it such that one would kill them to protect one’s 
friend group. A truly political union exists where individuals are capable of identifying some 
characteristic among their in-group (tribal identity, religious belief, linguistic heritage, 
ideological alignment, so on) and determining that they would lay down their lives to protect the 
 
56 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2008): 25-
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unity and continuation of this group. A state, then, is legitimated by its protection and 
representation of such a group. Examples from modern history of this distinction may include the 
creedal us of American Republicanism, the ethnic us of German National Socialism, and the 
class us of Soviet Socialism. Members of these societies would die not merely to protect the 
biological survival of their people, but also the conscious unity which they hold. A tribal warrior, 
for example, would die not merely so that his people would continue to live, but would also die 
so that their language, customs, dances and gods would remain with them; it is a defeat to be 
subsumed by the identity of another just as it is to be erased from biological history.  
This is relevant because, as Schmitt writes, the “state wants to be modern—a state which 
knows its own time and cultural situation. It must claim to understand historical development as a 
whole, which is the basis of its right to rule. In an economic age, a state which does not claim to 
understand and direct economic relations must declare itself neutral with respect to political 
questions [the questions of the friend an enemy] and decisions and thereby renounce its claim to 
rule.”58 What this means is that the state, which is the product of a life-sphere, must 
recontextualize and re-legitimize itself amid changing political centers, as the distinction drawn 
by the life-sphere is redefined in light of new centers, creating a new form of legitimacy which 
the sphere may bestow upon some outward product (which is for the political sphere, the state). 
But Habermas readily identifies his public sphere as possessing a legitimizing feature of 
rationality, and above it has been shown that this rationality is contextualized within a specific 
philosophical center and could change along with a changing center. What this implies is that the 
true public sphere is, like the friend-enemy distinction, a Schmittian life-sphere whose 
 
58 Schmitt, 2008a, 88. 
27 
 
legitimizing feature is defined by the philosophical center of those present, justifying the outward 
product of public opinion accordingly.  
What does this imply, and what does this allow us to say further regarding the nature of 
the public sphere? It allows us to understand that just as within one state there may be many 
aesthetic spheres of individuals who identify certain conflicting distinctions between the 
beautiful and the ugly, and there may be many moral spheres who identify conflicting 
distinctions between the good and the evil, there may be many public spheres who identify 
conflicting distinctions between the public and the private. This is what Fraser identifies as a 
counter public. Fraser, however, missteps when she claims that the ultimate root of all 
conflictory spheres is a discrepancy in capital, as this only reflects her economic center. Rather, 
some but not all economically minded counter publics exist in this way within an economically 
centered state, but certainly if there exist individuals who do not subscribe to the economic 
center, there also exist alternatively centered publics. Certainly, these publics are not the sort of 
interlocutors which are capable of reshaping the views of another sphere, as they lack the 
language of bracketed interests used to discuss matters of public import by the economically 
minded spheres. Rather, the sort of contest that exists between these spheres is entirely 
polemical, where Millsian debate is impossible due to a disagreement on the first things of 
legitimate public order. But even differing spheres within the same center are not capable of 
debate regarding what constitutes a legitimate public issue, for again59 the logic of the economic 
(or any other center) merely refers to the what-is and not the what-ought. For example, one may 
ardently argue through the lens of an economic center that racial discrepancies in capital exist, 
and still rationally argue against the relevance of racial identity as a legitimate public issue (Ben 
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Shapiro et al. come to mind). The individual public sphere and its distinctions, then, represent a 
decisionistic realm whose suppositions must be derived from elsewhere, and whose legitimizing 
logic does not allow for a marketplace of ideas which brings interlocutors towards some singular 
transcendent truth. Rather, the public sphere is inherently polemical, and debate in this realm 
represents the rhetoric of conflict.  
 
4. Conclusion  
In the preceding pages I have outlined the predominant view of the public sphere, 
investigated leading criticisms into this view, and then used the thought of Carl Schmitt to 
illustrate the philosophical errors of both the predominant view and its criticism. I then 
concluded by using the conceptual framework of Schmitt to reconstruct a view of the public 
sphere where the prior views have failed, creating a model of the public sphere which is not 
simply localized to one class, one philosophical framework, and one period in history, but rather 
allows for an understanding of public debate as a common cultural phenomenon with regards to 
the philosophical and cultural influences of its given place, group, and period.  
This model should concern first and foremost those dedicated to democratic societies in 
telling them that simple political liberalism is not sufficient to maintain the current democratic 
order. This is not some rational end-point which majorities will reach or maintain given time and 
open discussion; rather, the current bourgeoise democracy which we inhabit is a historical and 
philosophical product which can only be maintained by a reading public with a strong 
philosophical background constantly involved in public discussion to defend the philosophical 
underpinnings of their center and the distinctions they hold within. Indeed, this discussion cannot 
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be simply at the level of political and empirical observation (that is the realm of political science) 
but must occur at the level of political theory. Building on this, those committed to certain facts 
of our modern liberal society such as the freedom of speech, tolerance of religious and political 
outgroups, and a non-paternalistic public order must strive to preserve a culture of liberalism. It 
is not enough for us to say that free speech is something for the government to uphold, and we 
along with the private sector are justified in our canceling and denying a platform to the political 
other.   
Beyond this, this model allows for us to conceptualize the modern state not simply as 
beholden to one reading public interested in common material dispute, but as a beast of historical 
creation responding to the cultural and philosophical histories of many disparate public who are 
capable in theory of expanding their influence and becoming the prime legitimating force of the 
state. Beyond this, as change has occurred in past, we know that a change of centers is possible 
in future, and have no reason to imagine that our current state is the end-point of the mind. 
Indeed, a future shift just as significant for the scope, spirit, and letter of the law as a shift from a 
theological to an economic center is possible for the West. The questions by which thinkers 
today bracket other discussions will inevitably determine the energies of the political order 
tomorrow. If the current great debate is to be between an academic culture of intersectionality 
and identity politics and an insurgent philosophy of White identitarianism, the stage for the 
future may very well be set, especially amid the material historical events of demographic shifts, 
massive global population growth, Donald Trump, the refugee crisis, and mass migration. The 
proper response to such a possible shift I will leave up to the reader to decide.  
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